

## **KCNA detailed report on circumstances of DPRK's withdrawal from NPT**

Pyongyang, January 22 (KCNA) -- If the United States abandons its hostile policy and refrains from nuclear threat, the DPRK may substantiate through a special verification between the two countries that it does not manufacture nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula should be settled peacefully through fair negotiations that call upon both the DPRK and the U.S. to clear each other of their concerns on an equal footing. This is the consistent stand of the DPRK Government.

The Korean Central News Agency stresses this in a detailed report on the circumstances of the DPRK Government's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was released yesterday.

On the details of the DPRK's accession to the NPT, the report says:

The purpose of the DPRK's accession to the NPT was to remove the U.S. nuclear threat to it and, mainly, to satisfactorily solve the power problem with nuclear energy.

After deciding to regard light water reactors as main means of electricity production in the country, the DPRK had contacts with some developed countries to purchase such reactors, but in vain. None of them responded to our request.

To begin with, we intended to buy advanced LWRS from western countries such as Canada, Sweden and France but failed to do so due to the U.S. obstruction based on the COCOM.

So, we had to negotiate with the former Soviet Union on this matter, though its LWR was less advanced than western countries' in technical aspect. At that time, the Soviet Union contended that its offer of nuclear-related technology to the DPRK would be possible only when it acceded to the NPT and signed the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. So, the DPRK prudently examined this matter.

The DPRK acceded to the NPT on December 12, 1985 for the purpose of ensuring international cooperation in nuclear power industry and, at the same time, removing the nuclear threat to itself and turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

On the circumstances of the delayed conclusion of the safeguards agreement, the report says:

Even after the DPRK's accession to the NPT, the United States escalated its nuclear threat to the DPRK, making it impossible for the former to sign the SA according to the NPT.

On Jan. 7, 1992, the South Korean Defence Ministry and the U.S. Department of Defense and the South Korea-U.S. "combined command" jointly declared the discontinuation of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises. And high-level talks were held between the DPRK and the U.S. on Jan. 22, 1992.

As conditions and circumstances were created after the United States and South Korea made a verbal promise, the DPRK signed the SA with the IAEA on Jan. 30, 1992.

The third session of the ninth Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK held on April 9, 1992, approved the SA on "the premise that none of the depositories of the NPT will deploy nukes on the Korean Peninsula and pose a nuclear threat to the DPRK," and the DPRK informed the IAEA of this approval on April 10, the following day.

The SA between the DPRK and the IAEA thus came into force from April 10, 1992.

Referring to the details of the DPRK's declaration of its withdrawal from the NPT, the report says:

After the conclusion of the SA between the DPRK and the IAEA, the United States

spread the rumor about "suspected nuclear activities" in the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactor and its related facilities, sparking a "nuclear crisis".

An agreement was reached between the DPRK and the former Soviet Union on economic and technical cooperation in building nuclear power plants in 1985 after the DPRK's accession to the NPT. But, this agreement was not implemented except a site survey made for the project.

We, therefore, adopted it as a policy to create a nuclear power industry suited to its specific conditions to live our own way and began developing its own nuclear power technology.

For the development of its nuclear power industry, the DPRK chose a graphite-moderated type reactor which could be developed not with any other country's raw materials but with its own rich resources and technology.

Over the past years, the DPRK has honestly fulfilled its commitments under the SA.

We presented the initial inventory report on nuclear material and design information on nuclear facilities to the IAEA secretariat on May 4, 1992, far ahead of the schedule, which were to be sent until the end of the year under articles 42 and 62 of the SA.

We also ensured the DPRK visit of the IAEA delegation led by its general director from May 11 to 16, 1992, allowing it to inspect all the nuclear facilities it wished to see and even the objects it considered doubtful.

We provided full cooperation to the IAEA's ad-hoc inspection team in its activities on six occasions.

However, the United States and its followers of the IAEA secretariat used such inspections under the NPT and the SA to spy on the DPRK and undermine its socialist system.

Some of the IAEA secretariat systematically conveyed the results of the IAEA's inspections of the DPRK to the U.S., which, under the pretext of what the IAEA called "inconsistency", demanded a "special inspection" of DPRK's military objects, complicating the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula.

The U.S. invited the IAEA general director to a U.S. House of Representatives joint hearing on July 22, 1992, to inform it of the DPRK's nuclear program, while urging him to conduct a "special inspection" or "surprise inspection" of the DPRK.

Raising a hue and cry over the "suspected nuclear development" in the DPRK, the U.S. instigated some of the IAEA secretariat and certain member nations of the agency to adopt at the February, 1993, meeting of the IAEA board of governors an unreasonable "resolution", which called for an inspection of the DPRK's military facilities that have nothing to do with nuclear activities.

Timed to coincide with the adoption of this "resolution", the U.S. resumed the already suspended "Team Spirit", again seriously threatening the DPRK's sovereignty and right to existence.

Talks between the DPRK and the U.S. were held to discuss the "nuclear issue" at the former's request, but came to a rupture due to the long-standing hostile relationship and distrust between the two countries.

Under the prevailing situation, the DPRK proclaimed a semi-war state to defend the sovereignty and security of the country and decided to withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993 to protect its supreme interests.

It also took a measure of withdrawing from the IAEA on June 13, 1994 as the June 10, 1994, meeting of its board of governors adopted a resolution on the suspension of the agency's cooperation with the DPRK, calling for opening its military objects under the pretext of the "nuclear issue".

On the DPRK's unique status, the report says:

The DPRK's sincere efforts to prevent the outbreak of a war on the Korean Peninsula and ensure regional peace and stability and the world peace-loving people's strong demand compelled the United States to come out to the negotiating table for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue of the peninsula.

The DPRK-U.S. joint statement was adopted on June 11, 1993, after several rounds of the bilateral negotiations.

In the statement, the U.S. promised not to use force including nukes against the DPRK nor threaten it with them but respect its sovereignty and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs.

And the DPRK decided to temporarily suspend the effect of its withdrawal from the NPT as long as it considers necessary.

The DPRK had thus been placed in a unique status as regards its relations with the NPT.

This unique status was also recognized by the United States and the IAEA secretariat.

After the publication of the DPRK-U.S. joint statement, three-phased talks took place between the two countries and they resulted in the adoption of the DPRK-U.S. agreed framework on October 21, 1994 which called for a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

The report elaborates on how the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT on which it had declared a moratorium took effect. It says: The U.S. had no will to implement the AF from the beginning and has systematically violated the AF, calculating that the DPRK would collapse.

It has not honored its commitment to provide LWRs to the DPRK. The key point of the AF is the U.S. provision of LWRs to the DPRK in return for its freeze on nuclear facilities.

The U.S. deliberately delayed its conclusion of a contract on the provision of light water reactors to the DPRK, urging it to receive South Korean type LWRs.

As a result, the agreement on the provision of LWRs between the DPRK and the U.S.-led Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was concluded on December 15, 1995, almost 8 months after April 21 of the same year, the last day pointed out in the AF.

Only site preparation has been made in the project of the LWRs which the U.S. committed itself to provide to the DPRK by 2003 under the AF.

Due to the U.S. delayed provision of LWRs the DPRK suffered a huge loss of electricity and underwent a grave economic crisis which led to the present situation where even its right to existence is seriously threatened.

The U.S. has not sincerely honored its legal commitment to annually supply 500,000 tons of heavy oil to the DPRK in compensation for the energy loss caused by its freeze on graphite-moderated reactors and their related facilities until no. 1 light water reactor power plant is completed in line with paragraph 2 of article 1 of the AF.

At the DPRK-U.S. New York talks held in March 2000 the DPRK side suggested the U.S. to compensate for the loss of electricity caused by the delayed provision of the LWRs.

On November 14 last year the U.S. decided to stop supplying heavy oil to the DPRK from December, thus abandoning the last commitment it had been honoring under the AF.

This compelled the DPRK to restart its nuclear facilities, which had been frozen under the AF, to make up for a vacuum created in power generation due to the U.S.

decision to stop supplying heavy oil to the DPRK.

According to article 2 of the AF, the DPRK Government decided to lift the measures whereby the U.S.-made goods were restricted from entering into the DPRK and the U.S.-flagged trading vessels were banned from entering ports in the DPRK when involved in the DPRK's trade with other countries from mid-January, 1995, three months since the adoption of the AF. But the U.S. lifted only part of such symbolic sanctions applied against the DPRK in travel, telecommunications, finance and passage of territorial air but did not take any substantial measures to ease sanctions in such fields as trade and investment barrier.

Under article 3 of the AF the U.S. is committed to give the DPRK formal assurances against the use or threat of nukes.

On 1993 when the DPRK-U.S. talks were under way for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. worked out a "new operation plan 5027" for a preemptive nuclear attack on it behind the curtain of the dialogue and systematically stepped up its preparations to put it into practice to stifle the DPRK.

From early in 1995 "Foal Eagle 95", "Hoguk 96", "Rimpac 98", "Hwarang 98", "Ulji Focus Lens" joint military exercises and other nuclear war exercises targeted against the DPRK were frantically staged on the land, sea and in the air in all parts of South Korea almost everyday every year.

In February 1997 the U.S. moved depleted uranium shells from its Okinawa base to South Korea to deploy them there for an actual war and on June 8 that year it issued "an interim report" on the reexamination of the "U.S.-Japan defence cooperation guidelines" in Honolulu.

In January 1999 the U.S. Defense Secretary and the chairman of the U.S. joint chiefs of staff flew into South Korea to hold the 20th meeting of the "military commission" and the 30th "annual security consultative meeting" with South Korean brass hats at which they released a joint statement. In that statement they claimed that the DPRK remained a constant threat to their national interests and they would strongly retaliate against the DPRK with nukes and all other means in case of emergency.

No sooner had the authorities of the Bush administration taken office than they adopted it as their policy to stifle the DPRK by force and put the already started bilateral talks in total stalemate.

Bush went the lengths of letting loose vituperation against the supreme leadership of the DPRK and dubbed the DPRK "part of an axis of evil" in his "state of the union message" delivered at the congress on January 30, 2002.

A particular mention should be made of the fact that the Bush administration even went the lengths of listing the DPRK as a target of its preemptive nuclear attack, thus totally destroying the foundation of the AF and wantonly violating the basic spirit of the NPT.

In the wake of the Pyongyang visit of the U.S. President's special envoy early in October last year the Bush administration groundlessly pulled up the DPRK, asserting that it has pushed ahead with its nuclear program in violation of the AF, and blustered that there would be no bilateral talks and that would adversely affect the DPRK-Japan and inter-Korean relations unless the DPRK scraps its program.

The U.S. insisted on the brigandish assertion that the DPRK should receive nuclear inspection though it was stipulated in article 4 of the AF and in point 7 of the confidential mouth under the AF that the DPRK would receive it only after turbine, generator and other non-nuclear parts of LWRs are delivered to it, thus driving the situation to a phase worse than what was early in the 1990s.

The U.S. again instigated the IAEA on Jan. 6 this year to adopt an anti-DPRK "resolution" in the wake of the similar one on Nov. 29 last year.

The U.S., which openly scrapped the AF, instigated even the IAEA to internationalize its moves to stifle the DPRK, thus putting into practice its declaration of a war against the DPRK.

This compelled the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT, which is being misused as a tool for implementing the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK, in order to protect its sovereignty and right to existence.

As seen above, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is a product of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and, therefore, it is an issue to be settled between the DPRK and the U.S. through negotiations.

The conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the DPRK and the U.S. would provide the only realistic way of fundamentally solving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and peacefully settling the obtaining grave situation.

If the U.S. signs the treaty and legally assures the DPRK of its non-aggression including the non-use of nukes, the DPRK can also clear the U.S. of its security concerns.

Though the DPRK pulled out of the NPT its nuclear activities will be limited to peaceful purposes including power generation at the present stage.

<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/23.htm>