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Viewing cable 10STATE17263, U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT TALKS -

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SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT TALKS -
DECEMBER 2009

REF: 09 STATE 082572

Classified By: ISN Acting A/S Vann H. Van Diepen. Reason 1.5 (D)

(U) Summary

¶1. (S) A U.S. interagency team -- lead by ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen -- met with a Russian interagency team lead by Vladimir Nazarov, Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council (full participants list is provided in paragraphs 76-77 below), on December 22, 2009 for a second round of discussions on a Joint Threat Assessment (JTA), as agreed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in the 2009 U.S.-Russia Summit Joint Statement on Missile Defense Issues. The Russian delegation came prepared to engage seriously, and made presentations on their evaluation of the missile programs of Iran and the DPRK; a conceptual framework for evaluating the risk posed by various missile programs; Russian concerns about instability in Pakistan and the security of nuclear weapons and missiles there; and the work of the FSB (Federal Security Service) in countering efforts by Iranian and North Korean agencies to either obtain nuclear and missile technologies and materials in Russia or to transship the m through Russian territory. While the Russians were prepared for discussions of cooperation at a strategic level on countering missile proliferation, their position remained the same: in their analysis, the missile programs of Iran and the DPRK are not sufficiently developed, and their intentions to use missiles against the U.S. or Russia are nonexistent, thus not constituting a "threat" requiring the deployment of missile defenses. The discussions included a vigorous exchange of questions and answers, and concluded with an invitation by the Russians to hold the next round of the JTA in Moscow in March or April 2010. The discussions lasted the full day. End Summary.

(U) Opening remarks

¶2. (S) Van Diepen recalled that the July 2009 U.S.-Russia Joint Statement called for U.S. and Russian experts to work together to analyze ballistic missile threats and that the U.S. side had provided analyses of Iran's and North Korea's missile programs at the September JTA. He said that the U.S. side looked forward to receiving Russian perspectives on these programs and discussing areas of agreement and disagreement. He added that the U.S. hoped that development of a more shared perspective on these issues would help inform how the U.S. and Russia address missile threats bilaterally and multilaterally. Consistent with the Joint Statement and the non-paper U/S Tauscher provided to Russia in November, this effort also could help the U.S. and Russia assess how to defend against missile threats if that becomes necessary. Van Diepen ended by underscoring that the U.S.

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looked forward to detailed discussions and then deciding on potential next steps.

¶3. (C) Nazarov thanked Van Diepen for reminding both sides of the context for the work of the JTA. He noted that the July 6 Joint Statement said that experts of both countries would analyze threats of the 21st century and make recommendations for political and diplomatic means to address them. Russia takes this seriously, and President Medvedev has given the highest priority to this work and has instructed that this work be coordinated under the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, Nazarov said, the Russian delegation includes representatives from all of the Russian agencies responsible for tracking missile threats and countering them. He added that the Russian side planned to make presentations, focusing primarily on Iran and North Korea. After that, the Russian delegation would be prepared to comment on the presentations made by the U.S. at the last JTA meeting in July. He said the Russian delegation had studied these materials closely and had several comments and questions.

¶4. (S) Nazarov concluded by noting that Russia looked forward to a creative dialogue and robust exchange of opinions between the experts of both sides. He said Russia would focus primarily on the threats from Iran and North Korea, noting that Russia believed the long-term strategic interests of the U.S. and Russia largely coincide and that the acquisition of nuclear and/or missile capabilities by Iran, North Korea, or other threshold states is unacceptable. Nazarov hoped that the discussions would be productive and potentially lead to the drafting of a joint assessment, and perhaps to the creation of a joint document.

 (U) Russian Presentations on Iran and North Korea

Iran:

¶5. (S) Evgeny Zudin of the Russian Ministry of Defense gave detailed presentations on the Russian assessment of the Iranian and North Korean missile programs, and the degree to which Russia believes these programs constitute threats requiring missile defense responses. For Russia, the bottom line is that, in essence, neither program constitutes a threat at the moment or in the near future.

NOTE: Russia did not provide paper copies of either presentation to the U.S. delegation. END NOTE.

¶6. (S) On Iran, Zudin made the following points concerning Scud missiles:

--Given the challenging and complex situation of the regional context that surrounds Iran, Iran's leaders view acquiring a missile capability as a deterrent to existent threats. To that end, they also consistently exaggerate Iran's achievements in missile production.

--The core of the Iranian missile program has been the evolutionary development of liquid-fueled missiles based on Soviet Scud technology from the 1960s.

--Tehran acquired Scud B systems from a number of countries during the 1980s.

--The Iranian version, called the Shahab-1, has a range of 300 km and a reentry vehicle of 1 ton.

--With scientific and technological assistance from North Korea, Iran acquired production capabilities for both the Scud B and the Scud C.

--The Scud C, called the Shahab-2 by the Iranians, has a range of 550 km with a 700 kg payload.

--Iran has also developed and commissioned a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) called the Shahab-3, based on the North Korean No Dong-1 and using Scud-based technologies. The Shahab-3 has a range of 1,500 km and a 700 kg payload.

--Iran has done a good deal of work to improve the precision and range of this system, creating the Shahab-3M, which Iran claims has a range of 2,000 km, although so far the confirmed range is only 1,600-1,700 km.

--Russia's analysis indicates that this was achieved by reducing the re-entry vehicle weight to 250 kg and improving the engine.

-- Russia also believes that this very nearly exhausts the potential for Iran to increase the range of the Shahab-3 or make further improvements to Scud-based missile technology.

¶7. (S) Moving on from Scud-based technology, Zudin made the following points on Iran's development of a 2,000 km-range solid propellant system:

--Iran has been developing solid propellant MRBMs/IRBMs with better operational capability since 2000.

--Currently, Russia is seeing the development of a two-stage intermediate (2,000 km) solid propellant missile.

--The first test of this system in November 2007 failed. During the second test on November 12, 2008, Iran successfully accomplished the uplift stage of the missile.

--Following the third test of the missile in May 2009, Iran announced that the launch was successful and that it would begin serial production of this missile.

--This system was tested again on December 16, 2009, and Iran also claimed this test was successful.

--The Russian assessment is that regardless of optimistic statements from Iran, the test of this missile was actually just a test of a successful prototype and that what the test did was allow Iran to practice first stage operation and stage separation.

--Russia believes Iran will need another 2-3 years of testing to perfect the missile. Russia believes it will not actually be deployed for 5-6 years.

¶8. (S) Zudin said that another potential success indicator for Iran's missile program is the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) program. He said the Safir launch on February 2, 2009 was successful in putting the Omid (26 kg) satellite into orbit. However, Iran's first attempt to launch the satellite into orbit on August 17, 2008 was unsuccessful. Russia assesses that in order to achieve the successful launch, Iran had used

the maximum potential of its liquid-propellant technology (the first stage of the Safir was a Shahab-3). As for Iran developing combat/offensive long-range missiles based on SLV technology, Russia believes, in theory, this is possible. However, from a military technological perspective, Russia believes this is unviable due to low throw weight of the system. In addition, Russia believes that development of a long-range missile based on its SLV efforts would require Iran to intensify its research and development, conduct a series of test launches outside its territory, and increase throw weight and accuracy. Thus, in Russia's view, despite Iran's successful launch of a satellite, it is premature to talk about Iran successfully developing the technology for a militarily useful long-range ballistic missile capacity.

¶9. (S) Zudin summed up his presentation on Iran by noting that over the last four years, Iran has successfully launched a 26 kg satellite into orbit and conducted several successful launches of a solid propellant MRBM, according to unconfirmed information. However, Russia believes Iran's "success" boils down to creating Shahab-3-class liquid propellant missiles with an accuracy of several kilometers that can reach targets in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe, but given conventional warheads, these missiles cannot do substantial damage. Under favorable conditions, Russia believes Iran might be able to begin a program to develop ballistic missiles with ranges of between 3,000-5,000 km after 2015, but Russia does not see Iran taking any steps in this direction. Rather, Russia has concluded that Iran's ballistic missile program continues to be directed toward developing combat ready missiles to address regional concerns.

North Korea:

¶10. (S) Zudin made the following points with regard to the DPRK's missile program:

--Over the last two decades North Korea has paid increased

attention to developing and producing ballistic missiles and SLVs.

--The DPRK has commissioned the production of liquid propellant missiles such as Scud Bs and Cs (which North Korea calls the Hwasong 5 and 6), the No Dong I, the short-range KN-02, and the "Luna-M" tactical missile, plus solid propellant battlefield and tactical rockets.

--The core of North Korea's missile capability is missile technology from the 1960s.

--The potentially outdated No Dong-1, with a range of 1,000-1,300 km and a reentry vehicle of one ton, is the most advanced missile commissioned by the North Korean military.

--In Russia's assessment, only the KN-02, with a range of less than 100 km, is relatively modern.

--Since early in the 1990s, North Korea has slowly developed missiles of the Taepo Dong class.

--Russia estimates that the Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) was a prototype two-stage liquid propellant missile with a 2,000-2,500 km range.

--The TD-I first stage used a No Dong-1 engine, and the second stage used a Scud engine.

--The only flight test of the TD-I was conducted on August 31, 1998, during which the DPRK practiced separation of missile stages. North Korea declared this test to be an SLV launch.

--The Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) MRBM is a two-stage liquid propellant missile with a range of 3,500-6,000 km, depending on the weight of the warhead.

--A July 5, 2006 test launch of the TD-II failed as the missile exploded 40 seconds into flight.

--Russia estimates that North Korea tested elements of the Taepo Dong-2 with its April 5, 2009 SLV launch.

--Russia believes North Korea has demonstrated a certain level of progress in the missile area by creating a first stage engine with a thrust of 100 tons.

--North Korea conducted tests of nuclear devices on October 9, 2006 and May 26, 2009. However, it remains unproven whether North Korea can make a nuclear warhead of the size and weight that would allow it to be carried by a ballistic missile.

¶11. (S) Zudin said that in Russia's view, the widespread claims about North Korea's achievements in the missile area are dubious. In particular, Russia notes that it is claimed that North Korea has a new missile based on the Soviet R-27 (NOTE: SS-N-6. END NOTE) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that is capable of reaching ranges of 2,400-4,000 km. However, the many published reports regarding this missile, which is known as the BM-25, contain claims that are made without reference to any reliable sources. Moreover, Zudin said, the fact is that there have been no successful tests of this missile in either North Korea or Iran. Russia also is unaware that this missile has ever been seen. There are claims that 19 of these missiles were shipped to Iran in 2005, but there is no evidence for this and concealment of such a transfer would be impossible.

¶12. (S) Zudin said Russia believes the real missile potential of North Korea is an impressive arsenal of outdated missiles with ranges no greater than 1,300 km and that are only a threat to countries in the region that North Korea considers to be enemies. Russia estimates that in the years to come North Korea will devote considerable effort to improving and perfecting its SLV. To this end, it will use the launch facility near the community of Tongchang-Dong (NOTE: Known to the U.S. as the Yunsong facility. END NOTE). Russia assesses that North Korean development of long-range ballistic missiles based on SLVs is possible in principle, but perfection will take years. The prospects for North Korea developing a combat operational system from such a process is not likely due to the inability to conduct concealed preparations for launch and the long preparation times.

¶13. (S) Summing up, Zudin said Iran's and North Korea's missile programs can be characterized as follows: the only real successes are liquid propellant intermediate range missiles with ranges of 1,300 km, and both countries would face real technical difficulties in trying to make additional advances to increase the range of their systems.

(U) Discussion on Iranian and North Korean Missiles

¶14. (S) Van Diepen thanked the Russian delegation for its presentations, noting that there appeared to be some areas where both sides agree, other areas where the two sides see the same thing a little differently, and areas where the two sides disagree. He said it is good to have the opportunity to examine the differences and the reasons for them, and urged that this be done in a structured way. Van Diepen proposed discussion begin with Iran and North Korea generally, and then move to specific categories of short-range, medium range, and long-range missiles. On Iran, he said it appeared that both sides had similar assessments at the technical level with regard to short range missiles in Iran. On medium range missiles in Iran, both sides agree there is the original No Dong, a modified No Dong with longer range - although the U.S. and Russia have different ideas of the modifications made to achieve that longer range. And both sides seem to agree that Iran is developing a two-stage solid propellant missile.

Beyond that, U.S. and Russian assessments seem to diverge.

¶15. (S) Based on the Russian presentations, the U.S. delegation posed a number of questions. The Russian delegation also raised a number of questions about U.S. comments and the U.S. presentations on Iran and North Korea from the September JTA talks. The topics raised and follow-up discussions were as follows:

¶16. (S) Shahab-3 Reentry Vehicle Mass

The U.S. noted that based on modeling, it assesses that the modified Shahab-3 has 600 kg re-entry vehicle mass at a range of 2,000 km, and asked for Russia to explain the basis for its assessment of 250 kg re-entry vehicle mass. The U.S. also asked how useful such a missile would be as a military weapon. Russia responded that there is some uncertainty in its estimate, conceding that the 250 kg is at the low end of Russia's estimate. However, Russia believes that the low weight of the Shahab-3 warhead makes it pointless as a military weapon. Although the range could be further increased with a lighter warhead, Russia's view is that such a missile also is pointless. Additionally, while Russia views the U.S. 600 kg estimate as being close to the 700 kg weight of the basic Shahab-3 warhead, it assesses that the range of the system with that warhead is 1,300 km, not 2,000 km. Russia does not believe that if the weight of the warhead is decreased by just 50 kg, it is realistic to assess that the Shahab 3 would achieve a 2,000 km range.

¶17. (S) Aluminum Airframe

The U.S. said that its assessment of a 2,000 km range for the Shahab-3 is achieved through the use of an aluminum airframe instead of steel and increased engine thrust. Russia asked whether the assessment that the Shahab 3 airframe is made with aluminum rather than steel is based on speculation or fact. The U.S. responded that the assessment derives from information relating to Iran seeking various aluminum alloys. Additionally, during the Information Exchange (IE) portion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary, a number of presentations, including by the UK and France, also assessed that the Shahab-3 has an aluminum airframe and described a number of Iranian attempts to procure aluminum for this purpose. For this reason there also have been MTCR proposals to add the types of aluminum sought by Iran to the MTCR Annex.

¶18. (S) Safir Airframes

The U.S. noted that it appears that the first stage of the Safir SLV is the Shahab-3, and asked whether Russia believes the Safir could achieve orbit with a steel airframe. Russia answered that the facts are that the Safir was used to put a satellite with a very low mass into orbit. It is likely that

the technologies used to achieve this were exploited to their utmost. Russian analysis showed that the size of the Omid is the limit of what Iran could put into orbit. The U.S. agreed that a very low weight satellite was all that the Safir could put into orbit, but assessed that even orbiting such a small satellite could only be done using an aluminum airframe. In U.S. modeling of the launch using a steel airframe, the Safir was not able to get close to putting anything into orbit.

¶19. (S) Russia remarked that even if the U.S. and Russia disagree over the materials used in the airframe, both sides can agree that the capability of this missile was used to its maximum to get a satellite into orbit. If there is agreement on this point, then both sides should be able to agree that using this system as a weapon is pointless. The U.S. responded that this was not necessarily so and would depend on how the rocket is used. The Safir launch might have been a technology demonstrator. If one clustered or stacked the Shahab, it could be used as a longer-range system. The U.S. added that something using a single Shahab as its first stage will have limitations, but that is not the only option.

¶20. (S) Using Clustered Engines

Russia noted that during the JTA talks in Moscow, the U.S. discussed several options Iran would have with regard to a cluster scheme. However, in Russia's view, the problem with a cluster scheme is that it makes the missile nonviable for military purposes. The U.S. responded that a cluster scheme would make the system less mobile, but noted that it would provide a possibility for putting a missile further downrange. However, the basic U.S. point is that the Safir could have been a technology demonstrator for staging, separation, ignition, and control of an upper stage. Russia noted that it views the Safir launch as a success and has stated this. Additionally, Russia agrees there are ways to increase the throw weight, including the clustering of engines, but the goal of the Russian review of Iran's missile capabilities was to examine whether the Iranian program could create a combat ready missile that meets certain specifications. In Russia's view it cannot, and talking about the Shahab-3 as a long-range combat missile is unrealistic.

¶21. (S) The U.S. agreed it is not realistic for a mobile missile, but thought it would be realistic for use in a silo or underground. Russia responded that such a missile would require a fixed launch pad. Fifty years ago fixed launch pads deep inside a country were survivable, but now that is not realistic. The U.S. countered that both Russia and the U.S. still have hundreds of such launch sites. Russia said that was a topic for another discussion, not JTA.

¶22. (S) Iran Not Capable of Producing Longer-Range Missiles

Russia said its bottom line is that Iran lacks appropriate structural materials for long-range systems, such as high quality aluminum. Iran can build prototypes, but in order to be a threat to the U.S. or Russia Iran needs to produce missiles in mass quantities, and it lacks materials sufficient for the type of mass production needed to be a security threat. Russia further noted that the technology for longer-range missiles is sophisticated and difficult to master. For example, the elongated airframes Iran is using might not survive the stresses of a ballistic flight path, and the guidance system for the missile (Shahab-3) is outdated and does not allow for precision steering. According to Russian calculations, if the control system is used at a range of 2,000 km, it could veer as much as 6-7 km off its target; at 5,000 km, the accuracy could be off by 50-60 km. In addition, the liquid propellants used by the Iranians are of low efficiency. Iran is working to improve the power of the engine and develop more efficient kinds of fuel. However, it faces significant challenges. Iran also has problems with launch preparation times, although it has made some recent improvements.

¶23. (S) Launching from Silos

Russia said it does not think a Shahab-3 derived system could be launched from a silo. Ground launch sites that are for SLVs are not suitable for military launches, and missiles with side-based vent engines and clustered engines cannot be silo-based. The U.S. responded that this might be an area where U.S. and Russian assessments differ. For example, the

U.S. thinks the Taepo Dong-2 is a clustered missile that can be launched from a silo or underground launcher, adding that there are scenarios to compensate for shortcomings of this technology should the Iranians or North Koreans choose to pursue them.

¶24. (S) Iranian Solid Propellant MRBM

The U.S. said it does not see the solid-propellant MRBM as a technology demonstrator. This system has been tested four times in the past two years, and the U.S. assesses Iran will be ready to field it in less than the 5-6 year timeframe Russia envisions. Russia asked how soon the U.S. thought the system could be ready. The U.S. said that it would not be surprised if a two-stage system with a range up to 2,000 km were fielded within a year, at least in limited numbers. The U.S. also noted that not all countries follow the same testing procedures as the U.S. and Russia. North Korea is an extreme example, but Iran does not have the same test philosophy as either the U.S. or Russia.

¶25. (S) The Path to Long Range Missile Development in Iran

The U.S. said the main potential avenue for Iran developing long range missiles is by using current systems as building blocks. For example, using the Shahab-3 with clustered or stacked engines could be one path. Another path might be the so-called BM-25 missile that the U.S. believes was sold to Iran by North Korea. A third path might be development of a solid-propellant MRBM with more powerful motors. Russia said that its views on the Shahab 3 had already been discussed. Russia had some questions about the other two paths the U.S. had identified. In addition, Russia thinks it also will be very important to consider the intentions of Iran and North Korea that could lead to creation or improvement of its missiles. This will affect what each side (U.S. and Russia) does to monitor what these countries (Iran and North Korea) do to acquire missile technologies, including procurement methods. It also will help define the key technologies required by these countries now and in the future and in finding a means for protecting these technologies.

¶26. (S) The BM-25

Russia said that during its presentations in Moscow and its comments thus far during the current talks, the U.S. has discussed the BM-25 as an existing system. Russia questioned the basis for this assumption and asked for any facts the U.S. had to provide its existence such as launches, photos, etc. For Russia, the BM-25 is a mysterious missile. North Korea has not conducted any tests of this missile, but the U.S. has said that North Korea transferred 19 of these missiles to Iran. It is hard for Russia to follow the logic trail on this. Since Russia has not seen any evidence of this missile being developed or tested, it is hard for Russia to imagine that Iran would buy an untested system. Russia does not understand how a deal would be made for an untested missile. References to the missile's existence are more in the domain of political literature than technical fact. In short, for Russia, there is a question about the existence of this system.

¶27. (S) The U.S. repeated its earlier comment that Iran and North Korea have different standards of missile development than many other countries, including the U.S. and Russia. North Korea exported No Dong missiles after only one flight test, so it is not unimaginable that it would build and seek to export a system that has not been tested. This is especially true for North Korea because of its need for hard currency. In the U.S. view, the more interesting question is why would Iran buy a missile that has not been tested. One possible answer is that Iran has recognized that the BM-25's propulsion technology exceeds the capabilities of that used in the Shahab-3, and that acquiring such technology was very attractive. Iran wanted engines capable of using more-energetic fuels, and buying a batch of BM-25 missiles gives Iran a set it can work on for reverse engineering. This estimate would be consistent with the second stage of the Safir SLV using steering engines from the BM-25 missile.

¶28. (S) Safir and BM-25

The U.S. explained that based on a comparison of Internet photos of the second stage of the Safir, the U.S. assessment is that the steering (vernier) engines on the Safir are the

same as on the R-27. The weld lines and tank volumes from the Safir second stage show that the ratio of oxidizer to propellant is not consistent with Scud propellants and more consistent with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), which were used in the R-27. The U.S. does not have any information on why Iran has not flight tested the BM-25. It may be due to difficulties assembling the missiles, but it appears that they have at least done work with the steering (vernier) engines. Russia asked if the U.S. was saying that its case for the existence of the BM-25 missile is that individual elements of the Safir resemble the steering engines of the R-27 missile.

¶29. (S) The U.S. said that is only part of the case. In the media, and more importantly in the MTCR Information Exchange, countries have offered direct evidence of the transfer of the BM-25 from North Korea to Iran. Russia asked if the U.S. had pictures of the missile in Iran. The U.S. did not, but noted that North Korea had paraded the missile through the streets of Pyongyang. Russia disagreed. Russia said it had reviewed the video of the North Korean military parade and concluded that North Korea had shown a different missile. Russia does not think the BM-25 exists. The missile appears to be a myth, and some say that it is based on a Russian missile. However, no one has seen it, and Russia cannot find traces of it. The U.S. said it would endeavor to provide further information on the existence of the BM-25 at the next round of talks, noting that reaching agreement on this point will affect the joint assessment of Iranian and North Korean missile capabilities.

¶30. (S) Safir Fuel

Russia asked whether the U.S. had any clear images of the Safir that allow for the assessment of tank volumes and the ratio of fuel to oxidizer. The U.S. said that the weld lines of the second stage are clear in the pictures Iran put on the Internet, and U.S. analysts were able to make pretty good calculations based on this information. Russia questioned this, saying that the photos did not allow for accurate measurements of distances. The U.S. undertook to provide more information on this point at the next round of talks.

¶31. (S) The U.S. then asked Russia for its assessment of the types of propellant used in the Safir second stage. Russia said it thinks that hydrazine is used. The U.S. asked whether Russia thought UDMH might be involved. Russia did not. It said that there might be different combinations of fuel and oxidizers, but the base is hydrazine.

¶32. (S) More on Propellants

The U.S. asked whether Russia assesses that Iran is moving beyond Scud propellants. Russia responded that it believes Iran is trying to move in this direction because it wants something more powerful - something that can lift 40-50 tons. With bigger engines, Iran can improve missile range. Thus, Iran has been working to acquire more-energetic fuels and trying to produce UDMH and N2O4. However, Iran has been working on this for approximately 10 years, and Russia has not seen any serious results. Russia further noted that Malik Ashtar University in Tehran has been working on fuel combinations, but it apparently has not been successful. The fact that Iran has not succeeded in this area is evident in Iran's effort to seek this technology from abroad.

¶33. (S) The U.S. noted that it was significant that both the U.S. and Russia assess that Iran is working on more-energetic propellants, even if the two sides differ in how far along they are. Russia responded that this is due to the fact that Iran has not yet launched any longer range missiles. There have been no tests, and statements from Iran that it has missiles that can fly 2,000 km have not been substantiated. The longest range that Russia has seen is 1,700 km, and that was achieved only because of a reduced throw weight. If the U.S. has additional data to share, Russia would be interested. The U.S. agreed to look into the matter and elaborate further at the next JTA talks.

¶34. (S) However, the U.S. also noted that modeling shows that achieving a greater range is possible. Just because a capability has not been demonstrated operationally does not mean that it is not possible. Once a program has achieved 1,500 km, going a few hundred kilometers more is not that much of an obstacle. Going from 1,700 to 2,000 km is not a great technological stretch. Russia said it could not agree

because with a longer flight, various parts of the missile could burn through, the missile could fall apart, or it could go off course. It needs to be tested at its maximum range. As discussed earlier, the U.S. believes Iran can achieve the increased range due to a combination of increased thrust from more powerful engines, a slightly reduced payload, and the use of aluminum instead of steel.

¶35. (S) Russia disagreed with the U.S. assessment that Iran has been able to buy technology to produce solid propellant engines. Russia believes Iran continues to work on the technology to mix and pour the propellant. This is a very difficult process. Solid fuel has to be very evenly mixed to work properly. It must be put into the motor case and then allowed to solidify, and the resulting fuel must be homogeneous. In addition, fuel loading is more complicated for larger engines, and Iran has not mastered this. Russia also believes Iran is experimenting with fuel composition, how long fuels can be preserved, and how temperatures can affect the mixture. Russia does not think that Iran has solved the problem of thermal isolation of the engine from the airframe, as the junction with the engine tends to burn through. Russia also does not think that Iran has solved the problem of thrust vector control and gas steering technologies. The old technologies are not reliable, and Iran has had a hard time getting components from abroad. In addition, Iran cannot produce high-quality spherical aluminum powder and without this it cannot reliably produce solid fuel. Russia noted that even Israel needs to buy ammonium perchlorate from abroad. Iran has been trying to produce it indigenously, but Russia has no information indicating it has been successful. In Russia's view, Iran appears to be having very serious problems with engine development.

¶36. (S) The Ashura

Russia said that in June 2008, it had received information from the State Department that within the framework of the Ashura program, Iran is producing a 3-stage missile called the Ghadr-110. At that time, the U.S. told Russia that this missile is very similar to the Pakistani Shaheen-II and has a range of 2,000 km with a throw weight of one ton. Testing of the Ghadr-110 may have started in 2008, and Russia would like additional information on this system. The U.S. said that there appeared to be some confusion: the Ashura is a two-stage solid propellant missile with a 2,000 km range, and the Ghadr-110 is the Fateh-110, a single-stage SRBM.

¶37. (S) Sejjil

Russia asked whether the Sejjil was part of the Ashura program. The U.S. said it thinks the Sejjil is another name for the Ashura. In addition, Iran also has a short range solid propellant system called the Fateh-110. The experience gained from that program has been used in the development of the Ashura and helps explain how Iran acquired the capability to develop larger motors. In the 1990s, Iran received production technology and infrastructure from China to develop solid propellants. That infrastructure was used in the Fateh-110 and now is being used as the technological basis for the Ashura. While the U.S. would agree that a larger solid propellant engine is challenging, Iran has over a decade of experience producing solid propellant motors and it got an important head start from China. Independent of what Iran has since acquired, this head start allowed Iran to develop the Ashura, which has been flight tested successfully, and also to work toward longer-range systems. Russia did not fully agree, saying that the technology for an SRBM is quite different from medium and longer range systems.

¶38. (S) Iranian Challenges

Noting that Russia had mentioned several problems with Iran's efforts to develop larger motors, the U.S. asked for the basis of Russia's assessment and specifically whether it derived from the results of ground testing. Russia responded that Iran is having problems generally because it did not develop the technology in Iran and is trying to work off of North Korean technology. The U.S. then asked how Russia would explain the Ashura having been flight tested twice successfully. Russia said there is nothing special there as the technology is all old technology as described in detail in the literature of the Chinese Long March 4 engine. The U.S.

pointed out that the Long March is a liquid propellant system, and the Ashura is a solid propellant system. If Iran has successful tests, it shows Iran has built MRBM rocket motors. Russia countered that all it shows is that Iran is testing parts of the missile. Iran may have claimed success but that is not the reality. If Iran wants it to be reliable, the missile has to be tested many times before it can be deployed. This is what Russia believes. Russia understands the U.S. has a different point of view and this can be discussed again another time.

¶39. (S) North Korean Scuds

The U.S. said it seemed that both sides had a common evaluation of what types of short range systems North Korea possesses: the Scud B, Scud C, and the new solid propellant MRBM. Russia said that in 2008, the U.S. indicated that North Korean Scuds were launched at longer ranges. Russia asked for any specific data on these missile launches and for U.S. thinking on why these systems are extended range Scuds and not Scud C missiles. The U.S. said that it would try to provide more information on this issue at the next round of talks. However, it is known that there have been at least two cases of North Korea helping other countries to develop Scuds with longer ranges than the Scud C. One example is Libya. When Libya gave up its MTCR-class missile programs in 2003, it showed the U.S. a missile it called the "Scud-C." However, it had a longer range than the missile we refer generally refer to as the Scud-C. Additionally, many presentations in the MTCR Information Exchange have reported that North Korea is helping other countries, particularly Syria, develop a Scud with a longer range. These presentations have referred to this longer range system as the Scud-D.

¶40. (S) No Dong

The U.S. thought that both sides had similar assessments of the No Dong. Referring to the U.S. presentation from the previous JTA talks, Russia noted that the U.S. said there were seven launches of the No Dong in July 2009 by North Korea. Russia has no information on such tests, and wondered if there U.S. had been referring to 2006. The U.S. said that there had been tests of the No Dong just after July 4, 2009, and that there had been plenty of South Korean and Japanese reporting at that time. Russia agreed there were July 4 missile launches, but of missiles with shorter ranges, not Scuds or No Dongs. Given the confusion on this point, Russia urged that the issue be revisited during the next round of talks.

¶41. (S) UDMH

Russia asked whether the U.S. thinks North Korea is trying to develop a new engine that uses UDMH. The U.S. said it believes this effort is connected with a new system North Korea is working on. The U.S. thinks this new system is an IRBM.

¶42. (S) IRBM

Russia asked whether the U.S. has any specific data on this system. The U.S. said it believes the system exists and has been sold to Iran as the BM-25.

¶43. (S) Taepo Dong

The U.S. agreed with Russia that the Taepo Dong-1 was a technology demonstrator that is no longer being used, and that the Taepo Dong-2 has had two tests that have been unsuccessful. However, there is not agreement on the purpose of the Taepo Dong-2 system. In tests, the intent has been billed as putting a satellite into orbit, but the U.S. also thinks it is very much intended as part of the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Russia noted for clarification that North Korea calls the Taepo Dong-2 the Unha-2.

¶44. (S) Russia believes the system has an engine with a 100 ton capacity that uses clustered designs based on old technology, and asked whether the U.S. thought the Taepo Dong-2 uses any new technology. The U.S. responded that it has not seen any new technology associated with this system. Nevertheless, one path to acquiring a longer range system would be to cluster or stack engines for the new IRBM in the same way North Korea used Scud and No Dong engines in the

Taepo Dong-2. Russia pointed out that so far this has not been observed and there is no new technology associated with an ICBM in North Korea. The U.S. agreed that no new technology has been observed in the ICBM, but it has been in the IRBM.

¶45. (S) Russia noted that in its presentations the U.S. had given a range of 10,000 km - 15,000 km with a 500 kg warhead for the Taepo Dong and asked how the U.S. had calculated this. The U.S. said that for the 10,000 km range, it had assumed a clustered first stage and a No Dong second stage. For the 15,000 km range, it assumed a 3-stage configuration with the same clustered engines and second stage.

¶46. (S) Taepo Dong-2 and Military Applications

Russia pointed out that the Taepo Dong-2 would be hard to use for combat due to a lack of sites and its long launch preparation time. The U.S. noted that North Korea could mitigate those problems by placing it in a silo or using it as a first strike weapon. These would not be optimal approaches but if North Korea is sufficiently desperate, it would go with the systems available to it. Moreover, North Korea puts great political value on these systems. In the wake of the nuclear test and the UNSCR that followed, North Korea threatened to conduct an ICBM test. This is another manifestation of the political value of this program for North Korea.

¶47. (S) North Korean Path to an ICBM

The U.S. said it saw three potential paths for North Korea to follow to obtain an ICBM: 1) use the Taepo Dong-2 as an ICBM; 2) further develop the technology for an IRBM based on their new MRBM, in the same way the No Dong was a path to the Taepo Dong; and 3) use the very large launch facility that is being constructed on the west coast of North Korea to launch a very large missile. Russia said that the first two paths could be discussed at a later date.

¶48. (S) With regard to the third path, Russia wonders whether North Korea is building the new launch site to avoid launching over Japan and for safety reasons. The U.S. responded that the size of the facility is of concern. It does not simply replicate other sites. This facility is much larger than the Taepo Dong launch facility. This is not to say there is evidence of a new missile system larger than the Taepo Dong-2 being developed, but it suggests the possibility. North Korea does not spend money on things unless they really matter. Russia noted that North Korea does not have so much money, so it must economize. However, Russia can probably agree that the new site is being built to test new missiles. That said, Russia still thinks North Korea has problems developing more-powerful engines and accurate guidance systems. This merits further observation and analysis.

¶49. (S) General Comments

Russia said it sees it as significant that Iran and North Korea are trying to buy more materials abroad and trying to get around existing export control regimes. However, each country is different and Russia cannot say they are working according to the same principles. On clustering, Russia has a different point of view than the U.S., but will look further into this. Russia also has a different view on silos, but that can be discussed in more detail next time. In short, North Korea is complex and neither the U.S. nor Russia fully understands its capabilities. Both sides need to monitor this carefully and work together on this issue.

 (U) Russian presentation of a framework for evaluating missile risks, dangers and threats; and discussion

¶50. (S) Nazarov said Russia believes any missile assessments should be based not only on modeling, but also on consideration of the real technical barriers faced by Iran. Serious attention must be given to these technical problems. Otherwise, we will use erroneous assumptions to evaluate the problem. For example, we can count the number of centrifuges, multiply by production capabilities, and say Iran can produce enough uranium for several warheads. However, this would not be correct because the models do not take into account the technical difficulties in cascade

technologies that Iran has not worked out yet.

¶51. (S) In the same way, Russia thinks that when talking about the Shahab-3, there is no possibility of Iran using these missiles in a launch silo configuration. Also, Russia does not see Iran increasing the throw weight or range to the declared capabilities. Thus, as regards attempting to draft a joint report, Russia foresees no problems in an evaluation of the basic systems, but does foresee a difference in the evaluations of the technical barriers faced by the Iranians. With regard to timeframes, Nazarov said that if we talk about real threats, and not just potential challenges, then we need to think about all the systems that need to be developed and tested. To facilitate this, Russia thinks the JTA discussions should be divided into discussions on missile risks and missile threats. The two sides should agree on what these are and then work to prevent missile risks from growing into missile threats.

¶52. (S) Nazarov then asked Vladimir Yermakov, Director for Strategic Capabilities Policy, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to introduce Russia's proposed methodology for evaluating missile risks and missile threats. Yermakov said Russia views the December JTA talks as the first step in implementing the goals of the July 2009 Presidential Joint Statement. These consultations build on many years of work with the U.S. on missile defense, including missile threat assessment, and Russia would like to underscore that the dialogue and close collaboration on missile defense is due to the positive decisions taken by the new administration on missile defense. Russia's official assessment of Obama's missile defense policy is that it is a step in a positive direction. Russia commends the U.S. decision to drop the fielding of missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic and replace it with a multi-phased program for missile defense in Europe. Russia will only be able to give its assessment of the new project after it has seen the implementation of the first phase. Further collaboration in missile defense will depend on how the project will be developed on the U.S. side. But a key part of our collaboration will be the joint assessment of missile threats.

¶53. (S) Continuing, Yermakov said Russia believes that any further practical cooperation on missile defense will be based on a concrete joint assessment of the missile threats. The U.S. and Russia need to have a clear understanding of whom we are cooperating against and we need to make clear distinctions between missile risks, missile challenges, and missile threats. Russian and U.S. perceptions may coincide and may differ, that is understandable. We can work together to address threats we both agree on. But there may be threats the U.S. sees as real and Russia sees only to be perceived ones, and vice versa. In such cases, the extent of our cooperation may be less or lower, but we can still do something jointly to address these threats as well.

¶54. (S) Yermakov said that Russia sees as an end-goal of the JTA consultations a document outlining jointly assessed missile threats and challenges. Naturally, in working on such a document, the U.S. and Russia will recognize that their views differ and those differences will have to be reflected in this document. We can take as an example our record of cooperation within the NATO Russia Council (NRC).

¶55. (S) Yermakov then distributed a paper on a framework of criteria for assessing the level of risk of a given missile program. He explained that the material on the first page is a graph presented in simplified form in which Russia presents two categories - a threat and a challenge. In order for there to be a threat, it is necessary to have two components: intention and capabilities. Only when both components are present does a threat become real. From the Russian point of view, lack of either component makes the threat hypothetical. When both components are lacking, the threat is only "perceived," and the threat of a nuclear missile strike is zero.

¶56. (S) Yermakov noted that on the second page, Russia suggests four categories: missile challenge, missile danger, missile threat, and missile strike. Russia views a missile challenge as an aspiration to obtain capabilities in the field of rocketry to fulfill one's legitimate national goals. These goals can be a space program or missiles as weapons. A missile danger emerges when nations envision in national guidelines a doctrine that they could/could use missiles. A

missile threat is a more advanced category in which a country has the intention to use its missile capability to further its national military and political goals. A missile strike is self evident. Yermakov urged the U.S to review the paper and, at a later stage, provide an assessment of this approach. At that point, the two sides can compare views, theoretical approaches and assessments of threats, and use this framework to develop a joint document of challenges, risks, and threats.

¶57. (S) Nazarov thanked Yermakov for his presentation, saying that he believed the U.S. and Russia needed to continue their joint work based on a shared methodology. The methodology proposed in the Yermakov presentation will allow us to address challenges and threats concretely, and to overcome differences of opinion. Nazarov said he did not see U.S. and Russian differences as significant for a joint document and thought they could be overcome. In this context, Russia has prepared a memorandum with respect to drafting a joint assessment. The essence of the paper is that the two sides would work together to draft a document on a joint understanding of the problems of missile proliferation. It would be an assessment of the current trends, conditions, and factors that make up today's situation, and appropriate conclusions.

¶58. Nazarov suggested the two sides agree on a timeframe for drafting the document, which would lay the foundation for cooperation and make it more dynamic. Russia thinks the JTA work could finish by the end of 2010 and believes that following this round, the group could come up with a draft report and then work to improve it and flesh out some of its provisions. Based on the principle of rotation, Russia also thinks the next round of JTA talks should be in March or April, 2010 in Moscow. Finally, given the sensitive nature of the eventual final document, it should be treated as confidential and only made available to third parties with the consent of both our parties. (Passed over non-paper.)

¶59. (S) Van Diepen appreciated the thought put into the Russian document and the invitation to Moscow, which he accepted. He said the U.S. would study the paper and provide comments at a later date. This will lay the groundwork for productive meetings in Moscow. However, he also cautioned that the two sides must be careful not to let process get in the way of substance. He said the U.S. and Russia need to share assessments first and then think about what to do with them. He also said the two sides should identify the differences in our assessments and the reasons for those differences, rather than get bogged down in wordsmithing and nuances.

¶60. (C) Nazarov said Russia shares the opinion that the JTA study has a practical goal. He said Russia is serious about the problem of future missile threats and that the JTA work is under the close scrutiny of the President of the Russian Federation, who demands that the Russia side give an impartial and objective assessment. Russia believes there is a danger in over- or underestimating the threat as it could prod us to move in the wrong direction. When it comes to missile and nuclear threats, errors in estimation in both directions are dangerous.

¶61. (S) Yuriy Korolev, an expert from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained that during a meeting in Budapest in February 2008, Russian experts presented a collection of interesting approaches on assessing missile proliferation threats. Using that document, Russia thought one could give a more unbiased assessment of missile threats. However, there has been no reaction from the U.S. This may be due to the fact that only limited numbers of the document were distributed and they did not reach all appropriate senior U.S. officials. Russia continues to believe this document is interesting and would appreciate U.S. views, analysis, comments, and proposals on how to make our efforts on countering missile proliferation more effective. Russia's view is that the methodology presented would make assessments of missile threats more impartial (handed over copies).

(U) Russian presentation on the security threat presented by instability and Islamists in Pakistan and discussion

¶62. (S) Korolev noted that while the focus of the discussions had been on the missile threats from North Korea and Iran,

Russia did not think discussion should be limited to only those threats from Iran and North Korea. In the Russian view, there is another serious threat that should be discussed: Pakistan. Pakistan is a nation with nuclear weapons, various delivery systems, and a domestic situation that is highly unstable. Russia assesses that Islamists are not only seeking power in Pakistan but are also trying to get their hands on nuclear materials. Russia is aware that Pakistani authorities, with help from the U.S., have created a well-structured system of security for protecting nuclear facilities, which includes physical protection. However, there are 120,000-130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, working in these facilities and protecting them. However, regardless of the clearance process for these people, there is no way to guarantee that all are 100% loyal and reliable.

¶63. (S) In addition to the Islamist interest in these facilities, Russia also is aware that Pakistan has had to hire people to protect nuclear facilities that have especially strict religious beliefs, and recently the general educational and cultural levels in Pakistan has been falling. Due to these facts, extremist organizations have more opportunities to recruit people working in the nuclear and missile programs. Over the last few years extremists have attacked vehicles that carry staff to and from these facilities. Some were killed and a number were abducted and there has been no trace seen of them. Also, even if places are well protected, transportation of materials is a vulnerable point. In Pakistan, it is hard to guarantee the security of these materials during transportation. For these reasons, Russia thinks Pakistan should also be a particular focus of JTA discussion.

¶64. (S) Nazarov clarified that Russia believes the focus of the JTA discussions should be the missile programs of Iran and North Korea. Russia assumes the nuclear and missile programs of Pakistan are regionally oriented and thus outside the scope of the current JTA discussion. However, Russia recently hosted a delegation led by Senators Hagel and Harkin. The Senators told a meeting of the Russian Security Council that Pakistan poses the greatest threat to the world. Therefore, Russia would appreciate any additional information the U.S. can provide on the actual situation with regard to the protection, storage, and transportation of nuclear and missile weaponry in Pakistan.

¶65. (C) Van Diepen appreciated Russia's concern with Pakistan and interest in getting further information but noted that the issue as described is primarily nuclear materials being acquired by terrorists, it is more of a nuclear issue and less related to ballistic missiles. He undertook to report back and facilitate a response from the appropriate office outside the context of the JTA.

¶66. (S) Nazarov said Russia is interested in using all channels to cooperate with the U.S. on this subject. First and foremost, Russia is talking about the threat of nuclear terrorism. If the scenarios include future development, the threat of missile technology getting into the hands of terrorists should also be considered. Russia would like to put its concern on the record, and particularly with regard to the possibility of Islamists coming to power in Pakistan. Russia would appreciate the U.S. providing additional information on the subject - perhaps at the follow-up meeting in Moscow.

¶67. (C) Van Diepen said he would report Russia's concerns but noted that the U.S. response would likely come through diplomatic channels rather than at our April/March meetings. He also urged that Nazarov raise his concerns with Special Advisor Holbrooke or his Deputy.

(U) Russian presentation on FSB work to interdict Iranian and North Korean attempts to buy restricted technology, or to transship third party materials through Russia

¶68. (C) Anatoliy Raikevich, First Deputy Department Director, Federal Security Service (FSB), said that both Iran and North Korea appear to depend heavily on illegally obtaining equipment and technology from abroad for missile and WMD programs. The FSB has information that Iran and North Korea both have programs to try to acquire Russian

technology. One of the basic tasks of the FSB is to prevent them from acquiring WMD-related production technology in Russia. To do this, the FSB takes action based on Russian law and export controls. In particular, the FSB monitors and takes measures to prevent WMD technology exports. This includes criminal investigations of attempts to export contraband and items on the prohibited list. Russian analysis shows that these efforts have significantly reduced the achievements of the Iranian security services in this area. However, the Iranians continue to try to use the territory of Russia for transits and reexports of such materials.

¶69. (C) A key effort of the Iranian services is the company to company approach, whereby they use fake companies run by the Iranian security service to procure Russian goods. The FSB has set up sting companies to uncover Iranian activities. In the past two years, the FSB has cut off a good deal of the exports of such technology.

¶70. (C) The FSB has determined that Iran is trying to get equipment such as measuring devices, high precision amplifiers, pressure indicators, various composite materials, and technology to create new missile engines from Russia and from sources in Western Europe. To produce these items itself, Iran would need to seriously modernize its technological base. To combat this, the FSB must cooperate with the U.S. and European security services. Russia has many years experience cooperating with U.S. security services and has moved from information exchanges to operational activities. The FSB thinks U.S. services are very professional and well prepared, and hopes cooperation will continue.

¶71. (C) Van Diepen thanked Raikevich for his presentation, noting that he had had lots of experience during the 1990s working with Russian counterparts on the problem and trying to reduce the success of Iran in acquiring missile technology. Van Diepen said he was impressed by the people in Russia working on export controls and appreciated that Russia recognized that Iran is still trying to acquire technology from Russia. He said he would pass on to U.S. security services the FSB's interest in continued cooperation. He added that the U.S. would want to work with Russia in those channels as well as in diplomatic channels as the need arose to address specific shipments of concern.

¶72. (S) Raikevich replied that discussing these issues with the U.S. will help Iran and North Korea to "boil in their own oil." He said Iran and North Korean may have small successes here and there with procurement, but the FSB will see to it that their successes remain small. The FSB is grateful for information the U.S. passes along regarding various Russian organizations that may be working with Iran or North Korea, and wants continue to work together to prevent the spread of this technology from Russia and other countries.

(U) Concluding remarks

¶73. (S) Yermakov said that Russia thought the discussions had been productive and cooperative. He noted that both sides have significant homework assignments to complete before the next round and can test the results at the end of March/beginning of April. He then offered concluding remarks on behalf of the Deputy Secretary of Russia's National Security Council:

-- With regard to Iran, Russia believes the possibility of improvement of its liquid propellant missiles is nil.

--It is impossible from the Russian point of view for Iran to put a nuclear device on existing missiles with an improved range and throw weight.

--Iran has no ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons at this time, and Russia sees no threat from missiles in Iran.

--In Russia's view, Iran presents a missile challenge.

--A missile threat would only develop if Iran seceded from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and successfully developed an MRBM with a 3,000 km range and a warhead of one ton.

--Iran does not have the military-industrial capability to develop such a program. If Iran could gain access to foreign technology, it might develop such a program but this is unlikely due to export controls.

--In any case, even with the assistance of foreign technology, Russia assesses it will take Iran 6-8 years to gain the ability to launch an MRBM with a nuclear warhead.

--With regard to an ICBM, Russia considers this purely hypothetical and does not see the possibility of Iran having this capability for the next 10 years.

--For North Korea, Russia assesses that its only real capabilities are outdated missiles with ranges of no more than 3,500 km.

--While it is possible to develop missiles with greater ranges based on an SLV program, that would take many years, even with a successful program.

¶74. (C) Yermakov said these were the basic conclusions Russia wanted to make. If the conclusions are agreeable to the U.S. side this could be noted. If not, they can be discussed again at a later date and will be the basis for future work, to continue successful bilateral cooperation. He said Russia is not at all concerned about differences regarding various aspects of these programs. Russia sees this as natural. Having differences just means that we need to meet more often and exchange information through appropriate channels. Russia looks forward to a U.S. interagency delegation coming to Moscow. Until then the two sides can communicate through diplomatic channels or even just by telephone.

¶75. (S) Van Diepen thanked the Russia side, especially Nazarov, for its thorough preparation and professionalism. He said the U.S. was pleased with the interagency character of the Russian delegation and appreciated that Russia had given a lot of thought to both conceptual issues and technical matters. The challenge going forward - as shown in the contrast between the technical discussions and Russia's concluding remarks - will be to come to a greater shared understanding of the issues. On the technical side, there is a fair amount of agreement, but as we go up in range, our views diverge. Based on common data, we have different perceptions. The conclusions the U.S. would draw would be different in each case from the conclusions Yermakov outlined. That is not bad, but both sides need to work to understand the conceptual and technical basis for these views. There is a great deal to discuss, and we will need to be well prepared for fruitful and informative discussions in Moscow in the spring. The U.S. will study the Russian papers and follow up through diplomatic channels. The U.S. also will do its homework assignments, propose specific dates for the next round of talks, and be prepared for "our exams" next time in Moscow.

(U) Participants

¶76. (SBU) U.S. Delegation:

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¶77. (SBU) Russian Delegation:

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Andrey Shabalin, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Yuriy Korolev, Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Anatoliy Raikevich, First Deputy Department Director, Federal
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